NCJ Number
229012
Journal
Criminal Justce and Behavior Volume: 36 Issue: 12 Dated: December 2009 Pages: 1279-1304
Date Published
December 2009
Length
26 pages
Annotation
This article uses the Israeli case to show that police forces have inherent advantages over military bodies in the successful implementation of a counterterrorism strategy.
Abstract
An effective counterterrorism model involves intelligence collection and analysis for the purpose of identifying and thwarting terrorist plans before their attacks can be launched. A second component of the counterterrorist model is to prevent the completion of attacks that have already been launched, which can limit the harms intended in the attack. A third component of the counterterrorist model involves crisis management, which consists of not only limiting the destructiveness of a terrorist attack but also returning the site of the attack to its preattack condition as soon as possible. The prevention component of counterterrorism is best implemented by police units, because they are better trained and more effective in hostage situations than their military counterparts. This stems from both the quality of police personnel and the fact that they are able to devote all their training to hostage scenarios. Military units spend only a small portion of their training for such events. Also, police, through their routine police operations and intelligence gathering, are more likely to identify suspicious activities and terrorist planning in their jurisdictions. Police are also better prepared for emergency responses to crises in their jurisdictions through their familiarity with various facilities and geographical sites. Regarding the restoration of an attack site, the police force is the central player in coordinating a variety of emergency activities after a terrorist attack. The centralized semimilitary model of the Israel Police is optimal for dealing with terrorism, because to allows for the unification of policies, circulation of intelligence, coordination of casualty evacuation, and the restoration of terrorist attack sites. 3 figures, 4 notes, and 96 references