Political Communication and Agroterrorism

• NCJ Number: 226185
• Journal: Studies in Conflict & Terrorism Volume: 31 Issue: 10 Dated: October 2008 Pages: 947-970
• Author(s): Calum G. Turvey; Benjamin Onyango; William H. Hallman
• Date Published: October 2008
• Length: 24 pages
• Publication Format: Article
• Publication Type: Survey
• Language: English
• Country: United States of America

Annotation

This article reports on the findings of a survey conducted in October and November of 2004, which included questions to American consumers on their perceptions of “agroterrorism,“ i.e., terrorist efforts to poison America’s food supply.

Abstract

Of the 1,010 interviews completed, 47.52 percent believed that the most likely agroterrorist attack would come from a state-sponsored terrorist organization or government; 23.47 percent believed it would be perpetrated by a non-state-sponsored terrorist organization; and only 14.46 percent believed it would be committed by a domestic terrorist group. The finding that the majority of respondents assumed the agroterrorist attack would be sponsored by a foreign government and the minority believed it would come from a domestic agroterrorist was at odds with history and the conventional wisdom at the time of the survey. Empirical data on food tampering or agroterrorist activities in the United States show that only domestic terrorists acting individually have been involved. Further, it is far more likely that a food consumer will become ill from naturally occurring food-borne diseases than intentional adulteration. This article posits that public statements made in defense of the Iraq war at the time of, and preceding, the survey focused on the threat and not the probability of the threat from a foreign state government. By simply communicating and focusing on the threat from a foreign government, consumers were left to fill in the blanks for the source and probability of agroterrorism. Although reporting threats without probability might be politically expedient in a presidential race, it may be that such tactics are ultimately harmful in gaining public support for realistic strategies of prevention, detection, response, and recovery. Flawed public communications about the source and risk of agroterrorism could influence the public to become cynical and mistrustful of government bioterrorist policies based on empirical assessments. 5 tables and 45 references