NCJ Number
85895
Journal
Judicature Volume: 66 Issue: 3 and 4 Dated: (September/October 1982) Pages: 151-162
Date Published
1982
Length
12 pages
Annotation
This article assesses problems associated with the California plan for choosing appellate judges and evaluates alternatives being considered by the legislature to revise the present selection process.
Abstract
Under the California plan, the Governor recommends a candidate for an appellate vacancy to the three-member Commission on Judicial Appointments. The Governor has the initiative of recommending nominees and the commission may accept or reject them. Public accountability is ensured in two ways -- when the nominee is subject to a confirmation hearing by the commission and again later at the polls. This plan would appear to be a nonpolitical, progressive method of screening appointees for the bench. However, while the main characteristic of the plan is a judicial nominating body, in reality the commission serves only as a symbolic check on executive appointment power. The most glaring example of the commission's political vulnerability is the lack of specific qualifications for appointment to the appellate bench. Since 1934, there have been a number of proposals to modify the plan. One recent proposal, Amendment 49, would change the commission's composition by eliminating the attorney general and expanding the body to include two lay members. Other proposals for instituting a completely new confirmation mechanism are based on merit plans in other States. Merit plans tend to replace popular politics with bar politics, while general elections emphasize accountability without guaranteeing quality. In contrast, open hearings held by a restructured commission would enable thorough questioning of a potential candidate and would provide an opportunity for the public to challenge the fitness of proposed appointees. Forty footnotes and two tables are provided.