NCJ Number
188272
Date Published
2000
Length
22 pages
Annotation
This paper examines the establishment of civilian oversight of police, considers the themes of police information and government action, and argues that governments that state their support for the civilian oversight they have established often fail to put into practice the democratic principle of effective police accountability.
Abstract
The establishment of external, independent, civilian organizations to oversee complaints against police resulted from police misconduct and the failure of governments to deal with the problem by introducing transparent and potentially more effective police accountability processes. However, a wide gap exists between the principle and the practice of civilian oversight. Factors that determine the breadth and depth of the gap are not confined to internal matters under the control of the oversight body. Many are external and can be linked to the bested interests of police, the special relationship between police and governments, and the tensions that sometimes arise between independent oversight organizations and organizations. Police have had a disproportionate and negative influence on the powers of the civilian oversight organizations. However, action and lack of action by democratic governments have also been instrumental in hindering effective police accountability. Thus, some governments extol the virtues of civilian oversight while simultaneously acquiescing to police demands that limit the effectiveness of the oversight body. Some governments also restrict the resources provided to oversight organizations. In addition, governments use tactics such as ignoring these organizations’ reports and subjecting the organizations to biased inquiries to undermine their credibility. Another important consideration when determining whether a civilian oversight policy translates into symbolic politics is the reporting, monitoring, and review processes laid down for the oversight body itself. Footnotes