NCJ Number
164452
Date Published
1993
Length
28 pages
Annotation
This chapter examines why there is so much commercial crime and why so little is done about it.
Abstract
Despite the destructive impact of much corporate activity, corporations, through their economic power and political influence, have defeated or circumvented previous reform efforts with ease. The regulation of corporate crime has typically been achieved through the use of civil, administrative, and criminal procedures and sanctions, enforced by a special regulatory agency established by the relevant level of government. Studies of regulatory agencies have shown that current modes of control are ineffective. Further, current modes of control focus on the corporate actors who do the least damage; the largest and most powerful organizations are the least sanctioned. Another regulatory pattern is the perceived inadequacy of the sanctions meted out for corporate crime, especially those assessed by criminal courts. Both civil and criminal fines are so small that they amount to less than licensing fees, and for large organization constitute only a fraction of the profits made in 1 hour of operation. The chapter assesses efforts to regulate occupational health and safety, antitrust and monopoly, and insider-trading/stock market frauds. These are three major variants that exemplify different political economics of regulation. Of these three areas, insider-trading and stock- market frauds provide the clearest illustration of successful regulation, since the control of this type of corporate crime is in the best interests of the corporate sector overall, as well as being compatible with state objectives. Such laws protect the sanctity of the investment market, which is central to the ability of corporations to raise money by issuing shares. 81 notes