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Privacy Issues in the Presentation of Geocoded Data

NCJ Number
190416
Journal
Crime Mapping News Volume: 1 Issue: 3 Dated: Summer 1999 Pages: 1-3,8
Author(s)
Tom Casady
Date Published
1999
Length
4 pages
Annotation
This article examines whether professional standards or guidelines should be developed for crime mapping as it pertains to privacy and freedom of information issues, and if so, what should these standards be and who should promote them.
Abstract
Promulgating standards has the potential of establishing an accepted professional practice regarding the release of geocoded data; however, the concept of standards implies the existence of a set of practices upon which there is a reasonable degree of consensus among well-informed practitioners. Currently, such a consensus does not exist. State laws vary in defining what information constitutes a public record, and there is scant case law to further define the parameters for redacting data from an electronic data file that would otherwise be contained in a public record report. Guidelines, however, are a different matter. This term implies a less certain and more adaptable collection of considerations that may inform and guide others. There are several guidelines that can be gleaned from experience. Public record reports may contain highly personal information; better access to public records makes it easier for information to be used in undesirable ways; however, presenting geocoded crime data aggregated into polygons, such as police beats or census tracts, protects the identifying information that may be in the source records. When presenting data tables or records to identify geocoded points, police agencies must consider redacting those fields that contain personal information, such as victims' names, where warranted. Static maps that are not accompanied by database information or tables pose little risk of identifying specific households or individuals, while still providing useful crime information to the public. Eliminating exact street addresses in tables or records can protect the privacy of victims or other individuals. Most importantly, police agencies must ensure that the data being provided is from records that constitute public records in the jurisdiction covered. Ultimately, the benefits of wider distribution of crime mapping products to the public far outweigh the negatives.