PROBATION SUBSIDY AND TOLERATION OF CRIME

• NCJ Number: 52468
• Author(s): L L KUEHN
• Date Published: 1972
• Length: 24 pages
• Sponsoring Agency: University of California, Davis
• Sale Source: National Institute of Justice/
• Publication Type: Report (Study/Research)
• Language: English
• Country: United States of America
• Note: PAPER TO BE PRESENTED AT THE CRIMINOLOGY SESSION OF THE 1972 ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL ASSN, NEW ORLEANS, LA, AUGUST 1972

Annotation

THIS STUDY EVALUATED THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE CALIFORNIA PROBATION SUBSIDY PROGRAM ACHIEVED ITS GOAL OF REDUCING COMMITMENTS TO STATE CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES.

Abstract

SUBSIDY WAS INSTITUTED IN 1966 BY THE PROBATION SUBSIDY ACT TO ENCOURAGE COUNTIES TO ASSUME MORE OF THE BURDEN FOR OFFENDER RESOCIALIZATION. A SAMPLE OF 17 COUNTIES WAS EMPLOYED TO EXAMINE COMMITMENT CHANGES BETWEEN SUBSIDY AND NONSUBSIDY YEARS. SUBSIDY YEARS RANGED FROM 1966 TO 1969, WHILE NONSUBSIDY YEARS COVERED 1960 TO 1965. COUNTIES WERE SUBSIDIZED FOR REDUCING COMMITMENTS; E.G., RETAINING OFFENDERS IN THE COMMUNITY, FROM THE BASELINE ESTABLISHED IN PRESUBSIDY YEARS. CHANGES IN COMMITMENTS WERE OPERATIONALIZED AS THE PERCENTAGE INCREASE OR DECREASE IN COMMITMENTS IN COUNTIES. THE BASELINE WAS THE PREDICTED NUMBER OF COMMITMENTS FOR COUNTIES OVER AND ABOVE THE NUMBER OF COMMITMENTS FOR THE 4 SUBSIDY YEARS. SINCE THE 17 SAMPLE COUNTIES VARIED, IT WAS HYPOTHESIZED THAT DIFFERENCES ACROSS COUNTIES IN COMMITMENTS COULD BE ATTRIBUTED TO A COUNTY'S DECISION TO JOIN THE SUBSIDY PROGRAM. ELEVEN COUNTIES CHOSE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PROGRAM. THE HYPOTHESIS SUGGESTED THAT THERE MAY BE BARRIERS OR LIMITS TO COMMITMENT THAT ALLOW ONLY CERTAIN TYPES OF CHANGE, BASED ON THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL RED LINES (CERTAIN VALUES OF SOCIAL INDICATORS THAT ARE ANALOGS TO RED LINES ON MACHINERY). THE PROBLEM WITH THIS CONCEPT, AS WITH ALL HOMEOSTATIC MODELS, IS THAT THERE IS OFTEN NO APPARENT REASON WHY A SOCIAL SYSTEM SHOULD MAINTAIN A SELF-REGULATING AND BALANCING SYSTEM OF RED LINES AND COMPENSATIONS; THE ANSWER MAY STEM FROM ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES THAT HIGH OR LOW COMMITMENTS PLACE ON THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM. COUNTIES THAT WERE INCREASING COMMITMENTS PRIOR TO THE SUBSIDY PROGRAM WERE ABLE TO BRING COMMITMENTS DOWN DURING THE SUBSIDY PROGRAM. THOSE THAT HAD BEEN REDUCING COMMITMENTS PRIOR TO THE SUBSIDY PROGRAM EXHIBITED A LIKELIHOOD OF RISING COMMITMENTS DURING THE SUBSIDY PROGRAM. THE LAG BETWEEN INFORMAL-INDIVIDUAL AND FORMAL-COLLECTIVE RESPONSES TO RED LINE SITUATIONS APPEARED TO CONSTITUTE THE BASIC ISSUE IN PROGRAMMATIC INERTIA. A FEW COUNTIES WERE SUCCESSFUL IN REDUCING COMMITMENTS AS LONG AS 5 YEARS BEFORE THE SUBSIDY PROGRAM WAS IMPLEMENTED. THE DIFFERENTIAL EFFECT OF THE SUBSIDY PROGRAM IS EXPLAINED IN TERMS OF THE JOINT EFFECT OF COMMITMENT RED LINES AND PROGRAMMATIC INERTIA, WITH SUBSIDY BEING SUCCESSFUL IN MOST PARTICIPATING COUNTIES. A BIBLIOGRAPHY AND SUPPORTING DATA ARE INCLUDED. (DEP)