NCJ Number
86259
Date Published
1982
Length
24 pages
Annotation
Deterrence is a sufficient justification for punishment as long as the threat to punish, represented by law and legal authorities, is itself justified.
Abstract
Advocates of deterrence as a benefit of punishment are not logically pressed to support the punishment of the innocent to promote deterrence, since the innocent would not be constrained from prohibited behavior if they believe they might be punished regardless of what they may or may not do. Similarly mistaken is the objection that advocates of deterrence theory will logically press for the harshest possible punishment for every crime, believing that deterrence will thereby be increased. Deterrence for the more severe crimes, based upon harm and culpability, depends upon punishment being related to the degree of harm and intention involved in the crime. Should harsh punishment be threatened for even minor crimes, then such crimes could escalate to more severe ones as perpetrators would be motivated to kill all witnesses in an effort to avoid being caught and punished. One of the most powerful objections to the deterrence justification is that deterrence uses the criminal as a means to a greater end, and hence punishment on the grounds of deterrence violates the principles of Kantian ethics, especially the principle that all persons should be accorded self-respect and dignity. This objection fails to appreciate that it is the threat of punishment rather than the punishment itself that is intended to deter and that no punishment is involved if the threat deters criminal behavior. The person who chooses to commit a crime in the face of the threat of punishment has chosen to take the risk of being caught and punished as promised in the threat. While there is much debate on the empirical support for the effectiveness of deterrence on various types of persons given their psychological makeups and social conditioning, the effectiveness of deterrence per se cannot be doubted.