NCJ Number
158572
Journal
Michigan Law Review Volume: 93 Issue: 2 Dated: (November 1994) Pages: 320-381
Date Published
1994
Length
62 pages
Annotation
This article examines what distinguishes a bias crime from a similar crime committed without bias motivation ("parallel" crime), why a bias crime should be punished more severely than a parallel crime, and under what circumstances an individual is guilty of a bias crime compared to a parallel crime.
Abstract
Part I discusses the differences between bias crimes and parallel crimes. It explores the distinctiveness of perpetrators and victims of bias crimes, along with the impact of bias crimes on the victim, the target community, and society as a whole. The analysis shows that there are two overlapping yet analytically distinct models of bias crimes. The "discriminatory selection model" defines these crimes in terms of the perpetrator's discriminatory selection of victims. The "racial animus" model of bias crimes defines them on the basis of the perpetrator's animus toward the victim's racial group and the centrality of this animus in the perpetrator's motivation for committing the crime. Part II develops the argument that bias crimes ought to be punished more severely than parallel crimes. The author applies the analysis of relative harms to the context of bias crimes, concluding that bias crimes warrant harsher punishment than parallel crimes. Part III considers the aspects of bias crimes that are relevant in the punishment of an individual offender. The discussion in this section concludes that the racial animus model of bias crimes offers a richer theory than the discriminatory selection model of bias crimes and thus ought to be the focus of the study of bias crimes. 225 notes