NCJ Number
99838
Journal
Land and Water Law Review Volume: 20 Dated: (1985) Pages: 93-108
Date Published
1985
Length
16 pages
Annotation
This discussion of the deterrence effectiveness of environmental regulations examines difficulties in the criminal prosecution of corporate entities and the courts' unwillingness to impose sufficiently punitive penalties.
Abstract
Although Congress has enacted legislation aimed at imposing criminal penalties on corporations and their officials, prosecution and sanctions have been rare. This stems in part from the judicial attitude that pollution is an economic crime, often unknowingly or involuntarily committed, and therefore not deserving a criminal penalty. In addition, such offenses tend to be viewed as strict liability crimes and not as morally delinquent acts. Further, difficulties in prosecuting large corporations arise in determining criminal liability, proving knowledge of the offense, and devising effective penalties. Traditionally, fines have been light, in effect granting corporations a license to pollute and making noncompliance more cost effective than compliance. Additionally, large fines punish the public and/or shareholders rather than the actual offenders. To rectify the ineffective sentencing now occurring, it will be necessary to impose more stringent criminal sanctions, including both punitive fines and imprisonment on both corporations and responsible individuals. Included are 120 footnotes.