Reasonable Doubt Instructions: Commonsense Justice and Standard of Proof

• NCJ Number: 177246
• Journal: Psychology Volume: blic Policy Issue: Dated: Pages: 3-302
• Author(s): I A Horowitz
• Date Published: 1997
• Length: 18 pages
• Publication Format: Article
• Language: English
• Country: United States of America

Annotation

This paper reviews recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions and recent jury research regarding jury instructions and jury perceptions about the requirement that evidence presented by the prosecution convince jurors that a defendant is guilty "beyond a reasonable doubt."

Abstract

Topics discussed include constitutionally suspect definitions of "reasonable doubt," constitutionally approved definitions, the refusal of courts to define "reasonable doubt," and reasonable-doubt instructions and jurors' certainty-of-guilt standards. Cage v. Louisiana (1990) is the leading U.S. Supreme Court case that holds a jury instruction that defines "beyond reasonable doubt" to be unconstitutional. In this case the Court held that reasonable doubt defined as "such doubt as would give rise to grave uncertainty" violated the standard of "Winship" because "it suggested a higher degree of doubt than is required for acquittal under the reasonable doubt standard." In the case of In re Winship (1970), the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution as requiring that prosecutors prove every element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The "Winship" requirement applies in both Federal and State courts. The Supreme Court, however, has not required that any particular definition of "beyond reasonable doubt" be given to juries or that the term be defined at all. State courts and lower Federal courts have thus been given broad latitude to develop their own definitions. A wide variety of definitions have emerged, and the term is defined differently for juries (or not at all), depending on the jurisdiction in which the jury is sitting. Recent research suggests that most definitions of "beyond reasonable doubt" that have passed constitutional muster elicit subjective standards of certainty of guilt that are lower than previously observed. These results intimate that citizens may have altered the balance between due process and crime control values and may be willing to convict on a lesser showing than due process requires. This article discusses the possibility that, rather than the well-established "leniency bias" (acquittal bias) in criminal trials, juries may now exhibit a conviction bias in certain types of trials. 1 table, 2 figures, and 41 references