NCJ Number
144575
Journal
Yale Law Journal Volume: 101 Issue: 8 Dated: (June 1992) Pages: 2011-2016
Date Published
1992
Length
6 pages
Annotation
This article answers two critiques of a previous article on plea bargaining by these authors, which advocates the retention of plea bargaining under reforms based in a contractual structure for plea bargains.
Abstract
One critic, Judge Frank Easterbrook, favors the continuation of plea bargaining that is relatively unregulated; and the other critic, Professor Stephen Schulhofer, favors abolition of plea bargaining. The authors argue that Easterbrook fails to take into account that both trials and plea bargaining are imperfect systems for rendering justice and distinguishing the innocent from the guilty. If trials were perfect, then all innocent defendants would select trial rather than plea bargaining, but since some innocent defendants may not trust that they will be found innocent at trial, they opt for a plea bargain that will ensure a less harsh sentence. Innocent defendants should be able to engage in plea bargaining under the best possible terms. Schulhofer, who advocates the abolition of plea bargaining, also fails to appreciate that trials sometimes find innocent defendants guilty. Innocent defendants should have the option of reducing the risk of a harsh sentence should they be convicted by opting for a certain lesser sentence through plea bargaining. For the original article and the two critiques, see NCJ 144572-74. 16 footnotes