NCJ Number
189782
Date Published
January 1999
Length
64 pages
Annotation
This report examines the circumstances of the bombings of the United States (U.S.) Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania on August 7, 1998.
Abstract
The security systems and procedures for physical security at the embassies in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam as a general matter met, and in some cases, exceeded the systems and procedures prescribed by the Department of State for posts designated at the medium or low threat levels. However, these standard requirements had not sufficiently anticipated the threat of large vehicular bomb attacks and were inadequate to protect against such attacks. There was no credible intelligence that provided immediate or tactical warning of the August 7 bombings. Both the intelligence and policy communities relied excessively on tactical intelligence to determine the level of potential terrorist threats to posts worldwide. No reasonable cause was found to believe that any employee of the U.S. Government or member of the uniformed services was culpable of dereliction of his or her duties in connection with the bombings. Recommendations include improving security systems and procedures, such as providing a “special alarm signal” for large exterior bombs. Also, crisis management training for mass casualty and mass destruction incidents should be provided to Department of State personnel in Washington to improve Task Force operations to assure a cadre of crisis managers. All intelligence that relates to terrorism and security should normally be disseminated to concerned levels of the policy and analytic community.