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RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act) Confusion in the Circuits in Interpreting 'Enterprise'

NCJ Number
81304
Journal
Cincinnati Law Review Volume: 50 Issue: 1 Dated: (1981) Pages: 120-133
Author(s)
B A Myers
Date Published
1981
Length
14 pages
Annotation
This article focuses on the meaning of 'enterprise' within the intent of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and analyzes three positions taken by the courts.
Abstract
It first examines the provisions of the statute, the legislative history of RICO, and cases addressing the 'enterprise' issue (1974-79). In 1980, three Federal appellate courts interpreted the word 'enterprise' as used in RICO. The Sixth Circuit in United States v. Sutton reached the same conclusion as the courts in the previous cases of Cappetto and Altese, holding that wholly illegal associations constitute enterprises. The First Circuit in United States v. Turkette and the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Anderson limited the scope of enterprise significantly. Sutton's definition of enterprise is overly broad and therefore erroneous. As Anderson pointed out, allowing an enterprise to encompass individuals who associate merely to commit the predicate crimes may raise double jeopardy problems. Moreover, as Turkette recognized, allowing an enterprise to be proven by an association to commit the crimes renders interchangeable the elements of enterprise and pattern of racketeering activity. Furthermore, legislative history indicates that Congress intended RICO to reach only legitimate organizations: Congress was concerned only with organized crime's infiltration into legitimate organizations. In addition, people associated only for the purpose of committing crimes constituting racketeering activity should be convicted for substantive violations of State and Federal law; they should not also be subject to prosecution under RICO. Both Anderson and Turkette ensure that groups of individuals who associate for no reason except to commit the predicate crimes will not be classified as an enterprise under RICO. It is recommended that 'enterprise' be narrowly construed, as in Turkette, to include only legitimate organizations, since in Anderson's test, an illegal organization could still fall under RICO. Footnotes are included.

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