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Rico's "Troubled...Transition": Organized Crime, Strategic Institutional Factors, and Implementation Delay, 1971-1981

NCJ Number
189990
Journal
Criminal Justice Review Volume: 25 Issue: 1 Dated: Spring 2000 Pages: 31-76
Author(s)
James D. Calder
Editor(s)
Richard J. Terrill
Date Published
2000
Length
46 pages
Annotation
This article offered a detailed accounting of key institutional factors associated in the implementation delay of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) statute in efforts to control organized crime.
Abstract
This article attempted to fill-in an important historical gap by offering an account of institutional factors that should be considered in RICO’s delay. It explored certain dynamics of the executive branch decision-making in the years from 1970 to 1981 and the circumstances that consumed energy, focus, and time that could have been used to achieve victories in the war against the mob and other anti-crime initiatives. The executive branch authority controlled the switches of operational decision-making in the newly endowed effort against organized crime. Even though the passage of RICO was applauded, the implementation was not aggressively undertaken for several years. The statute provided tools to fight the problems of enterprise crime. Support for the law was highly favorable suggesting immediate implementation. Therefore, implementation lag was an important concern for policy initiative that had high praise upon development but only low agency commitment and understanding when tools were available. Explanations were tactical in nature and narrowly limited to agency-level failures. The newly organized crime statute was born in an age of dramatic political and social change, including a highly charged public sentiment focused on fear of internal and external enemies. Organized crime was seen as a domestic threat requiring immediate attention. The argument made in this article was that tactical explanations were entirely inadequate in explaining RICO’s implementation delay. The tactical explanations failed to accommodate circumstances affecting the decision-making environment in higher-ranking organizations in the executive branch. References