Right To Know: Whose Right and Whose Duty? (From Censorship, Secrecy, Access, and Obscenity, P 209-225, 1990, Theodore R Kupferman, ed. -- See NCJ-125023)

• NCJ Number: 125027
• Author(s): E Zerbinos
• Date Published: 1990
• Length: 17 pages
• Sale Source: Meckler Publishing
• Publication Type: Legislation/Policy Analysis
• Language: English
• Country: United States of America

Annotation

This article examines court decisions and scholarly arguments for a constitutional right-to-know within a philosophical definition of the meaning of rights.

Abstract

Scholars are on both sides of the debate over whether a right-to-know is within the Constitution's meaning. These scholars have relied primarily on historical interpretation of the meaning of the first amendment. Evidence indicates that the concept of the right-to-know stems from a broad societal goal, i.e., to ensure that a self-governing people be well informed. It cannot, however, be construed to be a right in and of itself. At most, the right-to-know is a name for a set of discretionary rights that are in some way related to a particular subject. Such rights might include the right to receive communication, the right to hear varying views on controversial issues, the right to hear from political candidates, the right to receive consumer price information, and the right to possess obscene materials in one's home. The right to obtain government information might also be included in the package. Under such a package of rights, the right-holder is the public and not just a portion of the public such as the press. The duty-bearer in almost every case of the implementation of the right-to-know is the government, which has the power to obstruct or facilitate the flow of information. 65 footnotes.