NCJ Number
189485
Date Published
1999
Length
8 pages
Annotation
Smallpox poses the most serious bioterrorist threat to the civilian population.
Abstract
The potential threat of smallpox as a bioweapon greatly diminished after the discovery of the vaccination in 1796 and its increasing availability. The possible use of smallpox as a biological weapon received almost no attention until the last few years. The Soviet Union, despite the provisions of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, maintained a large-scale bioweapons program in the 1990's. There are growing concerns that existing bioweapons expertise and equipment might have moved to other countries. At least 10 other countries are now engaged in bioweapons development programs. The number of potential groups that might acquire smallpox virus and use it is constrained by the fact that the virus is less readily available than many other agents. The potential for secondary spread of the disease markedly heightens the potential impact of smallpox. After an incubation period of 12 to 14 days, infected individuals would begin to experience the fever and aching pains of smallpox followed, after 2 to 4 days by the characteristic rash. An immediate, large-scale vaccination program would be needed to counter the outbreak. However, reserve stocks are very low globally. Because of the capacity to spread as an aerosol from an infected person throughout a hospital, special measures would be needed to care for patients. Isolation of contacts to prevent further dissemination of infection poses special problems, such as tracking such large numbers and enforcing isolation. Argument for retention of the smallpox virus is a valid one. However, some arguments that the virus is needed for the development of possible antiviral drugs are not valid. 14 references.