NCJ Number
61769
Date Published
1977
Length
88 pages
Annotation
THE POSSIBLE THEFT, PURCHASE, BARTER, AND COPRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY NATIONS, CRIMINALS, AND PRIVATE CORPORATIONS IS EXAMINED. SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR NUCLEAR MATERIALS ARE EVALUATED.
Abstract
DURING THE LAST DECADES OF THE 20TH CENTURY, PRESSURES UPON VARIOUS COUNTRIES AND ORGANIZATIONS TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL INCREASE. THEREFORE, THE RISKS OF NUCLEAR BLACK MARKETEERING MUST BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY AS PROLIFERATION OCCURS AND AS THE PROSPECTS FOR THE THEFT OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS WIDEN. ALTHOUGH NUCLEAR BLACK MARKETS COULD DEVELOP WITH THE EXCHANGE OF ILLEGALLY DIVERTED OR STOLEN FISSILE MATERIALS, A 'GRAY' MARKET COULD ALSO CONDUCT TRADE IN WEAPONS. THIS LAST MARKET'S OPERATIONS WOULD RANGE FROM COVERT OR OFFICIALLY DENIED GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NUCLEAR CAPACITY, TO ASSISTANCE BETWEEN MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS OF THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY AND WEALTHY NATIONS OR INDIVIDUALS. THE PRIOR INQUIRIES OF THE LIBYAN GOVERNMENT INTO THE PURCHASE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE ACTIVITIES OF AMERICAN FIRMS IN ILLEGALLY SUPPLYING ARMS TO SOUTH AFRICA, AND THE INCREASING MIGRATION OF SKILLED NUCLEAR TECHNICIANS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD ALL INDICATE THE GREAT POTENTIAL FOR A NUCLEAR WEAPONS MARKET BY THE 1980'S. IN EVALUATING THE SECURITY OF AMERICAN WEAPONS, PAST EXPERIENCE SUGGESTS THAT PROTECTION AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED ENTRY INTO STORAGE SITES IS SIGNIFICANTLY MORE DIFFICULT THAN THE PREVENTION OF WEAPONS REMOVAL. HOWEVER, ATTACKS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS SITES OR ON POWER REACTORS WOULD SERIOUSLY IMPAIR PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE CAPABILITIES OF THE GOVERNMENT. THE MERE EXISTENCE OF LOCKING MECHANISMS ON THE WEAPONS WOULD NOT PREVENT THE MISUSE OF THE WEAPONS. TARGET HARDENING AND IMPROVED INTELLIGENCE GATHERING ARE RECOMMENDED. TABULAR DATA AND REFERENCES ARE PROVIDED. (TWK)