NCJ Number
202702
Journal
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism Volume: 26 Issue: 5 Dated: September-October 2003 Pages: 347-364
Date Published
September 2003
Length
18 pages
Annotation
Using data from the speeches and interviews of Saddam Hussein during the 1990 Gulf Crisis, this study developed a psychological profile of Saddam Hussein that is relevant to many of the recent questions about Iraqi policy and intentions regarding weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that were pivotal to the decision to wage war on Iraq.
Abstract
The content analysis of Hussein's comments focused on what he said prior to the invasion of Kuwait and after the build-up of coalition forces in Saudi Arabia. This content analysis was used to assess his psychological state, political attitudes, and decisionmaking processes under stress. This assessment was then applied to recent questions pertinent to Iraqi WMD possession, use, and possible transfer to terrorist groups. Under the economic and political pressures of the pre-invasion period, Hussein showed a 277 percent or 2.5 standard deviation increase in levels of distrust, confirming the sensitivity of his negative perception of others when he was under stress, combined with the presence of significant paranoid personality traits. Leaders with such traits are unlikely to leave themselves vulnerable to perceived threats from others. The overall analysis yielded the profile of a leader whose fragile, underlying self-esteem made him highly sensitive to wounds to his self-image and obstacles to his dreams of glory. When such a wound was inflicted, he reacted with blame and rage, as his worldview became increasingly paranoid and suspicious. The analysis of Hussein's political psychology, sensitivity to threats, propensity for violent reactions, and tendency to miscalculate suggested that he had a low threshold for using WMD's, such that he may not have waited to be attacked before using them. The psychological profile developed also indicated that the same characteristics that made Hussein likely to use WMD's also made him unlikely to transfer WMD's to a terrorist group that was not under his direct control. A deception campaign to hide Iraqi WMD assets would also have been compatible with Hussein's political psychology. Although these findings originally added relevant insights into Hussein's emotional state, political attitudes, and decisionmaking processes during the Gulf War, their current relevance may be limited to highlighting the general characteristics that influenced Hussein's decisionmaking prior to the recent coalition invasion. Further research that uses Hussein's verbal statements prior to the invasion will be needed to test the validity of this general profile and to determine the emotions, beliefs, and attitudes that influenced his decisionmaking and contributed to his defeat. 6 tables and 17 references