NCJ Number
165866
Journal
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology Volume: 86 Issue: 4 Dated: (Summer 1996) Pages: 1305-1339
Date Published
1996
Length
35 pages
Annotation
This note critiques the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Schlup v. Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851 (1995), which addressed Lloyd E. Schlup, Jr.'s petition for the Federal writ of habeas corpus.
Abstract
Schlup, an inmate on Missouri's death row, presented new evidence that indicated he was innocent of the crime for which he was convicted and sentenced to death. Although the Court viewed Schlup's second petition for habeas corpus relief as procedurally barred, it held that he could receive a full habeas corpus hearing if his new evidence of innocence makes it "more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him." Although this is a correct ruling, the Court's opinion is not likely to significantly protect innocent people from being executed. First, the Court failed to recognize key points of distinction between the evidence of innocence that Schlup presented and the evidence of innocence presented in Herrera v. Collins. Because Schlup's evidence was much stronger, the Court should not have ruled on the issue of whether the Constitution bars the execution of a factually innocent person. The implication of the Court's silence is that full habeas hearings are unavailable on straight-forward constitutional claims of actual innocence. Second, the Court's analysis of the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception does not appear to contradict the argument that the exception is a rule of permission. Thus, after Schlup, Federal courts will likely be free to dismiss the habeas petitions of State prisoners even where new evidence of innocence makes it "more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted." 298 footnotes