NCJ Number
90263
Date Published
1982
Length
34 pages
Annotation
This article examines principal risks to energy production and trade and discusses how the energy network can be made more secure against terrorist attacks.
Abstract
Between 1970-80, there were close to 450 instances of sabotage committed against oil-related enterprises. These attacks could seriously affect the world's economic health. Transportation facilities, especially oil-loading ports, computer pump stations, and storage tank farms, are easy targets for air destruction. The most effective way to cripple Middle East oil trade would be aerial attack on the principal oil ports and offshore loading terminals. Anti-aircraft weapons, now absent, are needed to protect these loading facilities. Blocking the Strait of Hormuz at the mouth of the Persian Gulf would be crippling to the oil industry. Yet many analysts suggest that conventional military operations in the Persian Gulf could not protect oil installations. The U.S. oil industry's production, distribution, and storage facilities are considered to be prime targets for any disaffected group knowledgeable of a particular system and with the will to act. U.S. pipeline systems, and to a lesser extent offshore facilities, remain the most attractive targets for terrorists. Incidents have also occurred against U.S. electric utilities, nuclear power plants, and coal and uranium mining. Both U.S. plants and transport facilities and Middle Eastern facilities have very inadequate security measures against terrorist attacks. Although military actions by the U.S. and its allies could prevent Middle Eastern oil from falling into Soviet hands, they probably could not restore the flow of oil because of enormous technical and economic resources required to rebuild the oil infrastructure. A total of 62 reference notes and a list of sabotage incidents (1970-80) are included.