NCJ Number
84013
Journal
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology Volume: 73 Issue: 1 Dated: (Spring 1982) Pages: 379-387
Date Published
1982
Length
9 pages
Annotation
This South Carolina study suggests that sentence disparity and jury bias still operate in the administration of the death penalty despite the procedural safeguards established in the U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Gregg and Witherspoon.
Abstract
In Gregg v. Georgia, the Supreme Court suggested formal guidelines and standards for capital cases to reduce arbitrariness and capriciousness. In the Witherspoon case, the Court ruled unconstitutional the then existing Illinois death statute, which permitted the exclusion for cause of any venireman who had 'conscientious or religious scruples against the infliction of the death penalty in a proper case.' The Witherspoon standard enunciated by the Court permits veniremen in capital cases to be excluded for cause if they claim either that they can imagine no circumstance in which as jurors they could vote for the death penalty or that knowledge that the defendant, if convicted, could receive the death penalty would keep them from being able to render fair and impartial decisions on the issue of guilt. The South Carolina study shows that while it appears that white defendants are more likely to have the death penalty requested in their cases, this is only because white defendants are more likely to have white victims. Discrimination still appears to exist, but it now takes the form of a greater probability that prosecutors will seek the death penalty if the victim is white. Further, the death-qualification procedures approved in Witherspoon appear to produce juries biased towards both convictions and the death penalty and disproportionately exclude blacks from serving on capital juries. Tabular data and 19 footnotes are provided.