NCJ Number
174888
Journal
Journal of Financial Crime Volume: 4 Issue: 3 Dated: January 1997 Pages: 223-231
Date Published
1997
Length
9 pages
Annotation
This paper examines implications for the right against self- incrimination of the enhanced powers provided the British Serious Fraud Office (SFO) under s. 2 of the Criminal Justice Act 1987.
Abstract
The right to silence has been abrogated in a limited sense in s. 2, because answers that a suspect is required to give in pretrial investigations by the SFO under s. 2 are inadmissible as evidence unless proceedings are brought under s. 2(14) of the 1987 Act for giving false information or, by s. 2(8), when the individual "makes a statement inconsistent with it." Strictly speaking, s. 2(8) protects a defendant from self-incrimination, but the information provided can lead the investigators to search for admissible original evidence, as the SFO stated in its evidence to the Royal Commission. Further, s. 2(2) does not allow a defendant to claim a privilege against self-incrimination. From a conceptual and necessity perspective, s. 2 powers are justified, but safeguards such as the one in s. 2(8) are necessary. The SFO should use s. 2 to overcome deficiencies in other areas such as the defense case statement or the defense tailoring its case after hearing co-defendants, but s. 2 should not preclude independent investigations. 68 references