Shining Light on "Dark Winter"

• NCJ Number: 193923
• Journal: Clinical Infectious Diseases Volume: 34 Dated: April 1, 2002 Pages: 972-983
• Author(s): Tara O'Toole; Michael Mair; Thomas V. Inglesby
• Date Published: 2002
• Length: 12 pages
• Publication Format: Article
• Publication Type: Training
• Language: English
• Country: United States of America

Annotation

This report describes and draws lessons from a senior-level exercise entitled, "Dark Winter," which simulated a covert smallpox attack on the United States.

Abstract

"Dark Winter" was constructed to examine the challenges that senior-level policymakers would face if confronted with a bioterrorist attack that initiated outbreaks of a highly contagious disease. The 12 participants in "Dark Winter" portrayed members of the National Security Council (NSC). Each participant was serving or had served in high-level government or military positions. The simulation was divided into three segments and simulated a time span of 2 weeks. Each segment portrayed an NSC meeting, with the meetings set several days apart in the scenario. NSC decision-makers were asked to react to the facts and context of the scenario, establish strategies, and make policy decisions. To the extent possible, the decisions made were incorporated into the evolving exercise, so that key decisions affected the evolution and outcomes of the scenario. The lessons drawn in this report are based on an analysis of comments and decisions made by exercise participants during the exercise, subsequent congressional testimony by exercise participants, and public interviews given by participants in the months after the exercise. The lessons drawn were these: leaders are unfamiliar with the character of bioterrorist attacks, available policy options, and their consequences; after a bioterrorist attack, leaders' decisions would depend on data and expertise from the medical and public health sectors; the lack of sufficient vaccine or drugs to prevent the spread of disease severely limit management options; to end a disease outbreak after a bioterrorist attack, decision makers will require ongoing expert advice from senior public health and medical leaders; Federal and State priorities may be unclear, differ, or conflict; authorities may be uncertain; constitutional issues may arise; and the individual actions of citizens will be critical to ending the spread of contagious disease, so leaders must gain the trust and sustained cooperation of the American people. 33 references