Should Juries Nullify Laws They Consider Unjust or Excessively Punitive? (From Crime & Justice in America: Present Realities and Future Prospects, Second Edition, P 272-277, 2002, Wilson R. Palacios, Paul F. Cromwell, and Roger G. Dunham, eds. -- NCJ-188466)

• NCJ Number: 188479
• Author(s): Clay S. Conrad; Nancy King
• Date Published: 2002
• Length: 6 pages
• Sale Source: Prentice-Hall, Inc
• Publication Format: Book (Softbound)
• Publication Type: Legislation/Policy Analysis
• Language: English
• Country: United States of America

Annotation

The authors take opposing views regarding whether juries should be permitted to nullify laws they consider unjust or excessively punitive.

Abstract

One author argues that juries can and should correct the overly broad use of criminal sanctions. The following are some reasons why juries should have the power to bring some rationality and justice to the application of the law: the nonsensical distinctions between powder and crack cocaine; enormous penalties for many minor crimes; unfair sentencing favoritism given to snitches (who serve a small fraction of the time given their underlings); criminalization of "wetlands" violations; regulatory, licensing, and administrative infractions; and the often mechanical application of law favored by prosecutors have resulted in a hodgepodge of injustices strung together without reason. By refusing to enforce unjust laws, juries can help improve the law and the society it governs. In opposing jury nullification, the other author argues that a small group of citizens (the jury) should not have the power to subvert the will of the people as expressed through elected legislators who represent the people. To invite nullification is to invite jurors to devise their own defenses to a criminal charge. Juries have acquitted defendants in rape cases after concluding that the victims deserved to be raped because of the way they dressed or acted. Jurors may acquit protesters who trespass, damage property, or harm others if they conclude the defendants were right to bypass lawful means of redress. It is not feasible to attempt to separate "good" nullification from "bad" nullification. Even nullification advocates cannot agree on what type of nullification is acceptable. The Constitution does not support an enhanced law-making role for juries. Jurors have no personal constitutional right to disregard the law; otherwise, they would not be required to take an oath to obey it. Legislators and judges have rejected repeated proposals to lower barriers to jury nullification, because they understand that the costs of such changes would far outweigh any benefits the changes may bring.