NCJ Number
238157
Journal
Criminology and Public Policy Volume: 11 Issue: 1 Dated: February 2012 Pages: 21-50
Date Published
February 2012
Length
30 pages
Annotation
This study uses a well-developed theory from labor economics called "signaling theory" (Spence, 1973) in arguing that employment-based reentry programs still serve an important role in the reentry process, even if they do not directly impact employment and recidivism.
Abstract
Following a brief literature review on employment-based reentry programs, focusing on the most recent experimental evaluations, this study discusses recent studies of criminal recidivism and "redemption." This is followed by a review of studies that illustrate sorting or selection mechanisms (long used to justify randomization) in the evaluation of work programs. These two research strands are used to develop an argument for using the completion of voluntary work programs as an important "signal" for employers in determining whether to hire a person recently released from incarceration. The concept of "signaling" has been formalized in labor economics. Because potential employers make hiring decisions and wage offers in the absence of perfect information about applicants' true productivity, they may resort to what they regard as reliable indicators of that productivity. Among these indicators are job-market "signals," which are observable attributes that convey information about an individual's productivity. This concept of "signaling" as a mechanism for employers to use in deciding whom to employ suggests that policymakers identify explicit mechanisms that will allow former inmates who have desisted from crime to self-identify to employers or other decisionmakers shortly after they have been released. This article argues that completion of a voluntary employment program is in itself a "signal" that the prospective employee is motivated and committed to a productive and responsible involvement in the work force. 73 references