Social and Cultural Factors as a Diminished Capacity Defense in Criminal Law

• NCJ Number: 73210
• Journal: Bulletin of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law Volume: 6 Issue: 2 Dated: (1978) Pages: 195-208
• Author(s): B L Diamond
• Date Published: 1978
• Length: 14 pages
• Publication Format: Article
• Language: English
• Country: United States of America

Annotation

This article compares the diminished capacity and insanity defenses, reviews court decisions on diminished capacity in England and California, and discusses sociocultural factors contributing to diminished capacity.

Abstract

Since the late 1950's the diminished capacity defense in both California and England has proven superior to the traditional insanity defense. In contrast to the insanity defense, which developed within the medical model of disease, the diminished capacity defense has its roots in the issue of intoxication. The two key decisions which established the diminished capacity in California, referred to as the Wells-Gorshen Doctrine, never implied any restriction to intoxication, mental disease, or defect; evidence of any condition which affects the defendant's capacity to possess the mental state required by the definition of the charged crime is admissible. Current law, as later stated in Berry, limits the scope of admissible evidence, however, this issue is central to the debate over diminished capacity. The establishment of a diminished capacity defense based upon social and cultural factors does not mean that every defendant whose ethnic, social, or cultural background differs from that of the standard 'middle American' will be excused from full responsibility for criminal acts. Decisions of guilt must come from the careful weighing of the particular factors of the defendant's background, their impact on mental faculties, and their relevance to the mens rea. It is proposed that the trier of fact in a trial involving criminal intent be allowed to hear evidence giving the defendant's relevant social and cultural background in order to determine whether such evidence might negate, through diminished capacity, the specific intent required by the definition of the charged crime. The Croatian skyjacker testimony was offered on such grounds, but a Federal district court found such evidence inadmissible. Notes which include references and the author's testimony in the Croatian skyjacker case are included.