NCJ Number
80066
Journal
Journal of Law Reform Volume: 14 Issue: 1 Dated: (Fall 1980) Pages: 105-125
Date Published
1980
Length
21 pages
Annotation
This article discusses how courts have handled the remedy dilemma presented by unfulfillable plea bargains, arising from a prosecutor's promise to a defendant of some benefit which the prosecutor lacks the authority to provide.
Abstract
An analysis of the seminal Supreme Court opinion on the broken plea bargain question, Santobello v. New York, concludes that choice-of-remedy is not entirely a matter of lower court discretion. Rather, Santobello delegates to lower courts the authority to develop a law of remedies which is 'reasonably due in the circumstances,' with considerable weight given to the defendant's preference. The central difficulties with unfulfillable plea bargains concerns the binding of parties outside the prosecutor's usual sphere of influence. The trend has been towards binding an increasingly wider circle of actors until Bauer v. United States, when the Fifth Circuit refused to force the State Department to abrogate the terms of an extradition treaty with another country. Under a recommended model analysis, courts faced with an unfulfillable plea bargain would first require the defendant seeking specific performance to show detrimental reliance on the bargain. If the defendant does so, demonstrating that the preplea situation cannot be restored by withdrawing the plea, the court would presume specific performance to be the appropriate remedy. This presumption would be rebutted if the prosecution, in turn, can show that immediate, compelling harm to the bound party would result from enforcement. This analysis pares the remedy decision down to its essential components: reliance by the defendant versus harm to the party bound by the bargain. A policy of 'laissez faire' should not apply to plea bargaining, a procedure which is not specified by constitutional rights. Footnotes are provided. (Author summary modified)