NCJ Number
49334
Journal
Catholic University Law Review Volume: 25 Dated: (FALL 1975) Pages: 130-147
Date Published
1975
Length
18 pages
Annotation
THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT OF 1974 MANDATES THAT, BY 1980, THE PERIOD OF DELAY IN ALL FEDERAL AND DISTRICT COURTS SHALL NOT EXCEED 100 DAYS, SUBJECT TO A VARIETY OF EXCLUDABLE PERIODS OF DELAY.
Abstract
THE TIME LIMITS SET IN THE ACT WILL BE ENFORCED BY MANDATORY DISMISSAL OF CRIMINAL CHARGES, ON THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION, WHEN THE TIME LIMITS ARE EXCEEDED. THE ACT IMPOSES TIME LIMITS FOR THREE SEPARATE INTERVALS: (1) ANY INFORMATION OR INDICTMENT MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF ARREST OR SERVICE OF THE SUMMONS IN CONNECTION WITH AN OFFENSE; (2) ARRAIGNMENT OF THE ACCUSED MUST BE HELD WITHIN 10 DAYS OF THE FILING DATE OF INFORMATION/INDICTMENT OR OF THE DATE THE ACCUSED IS ORDERED HELD TO ANSWER AND APPEARS BEFORE A JUDICIAL OFFICER IN THE COURT IN WHICH THE CHARGE IS PENDING, WHICHEVER OCCURS LATER; AND (3) WHERE A PLEA OF NOT GUILTY IS ENTERED, TRIAL MUST BEGIN WITHIN 60 DAYS FROM DATE OF ARRAIGNMENT. THE MANDATED TIME LIMITS ARE INTENDED TO DEFINE AND IMPLEMENT THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL AND TO ENHANCE THE DETERRENT VALUE OF PUNISHMENT BY MAKING THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE EFFICIENT AND SWIFT. FURTHER, REDUCTION IN DELAY WOULD ALSO REDUCE THE TIME AND OPPORTUNITY AVAILABLE TO PERSONS RELEASED PENDING TRIAL TO COMMIT OTHER OFFENSES. THE TIME LIMITS IMPOSED ARE SUBJECT TO NUMEROUS EXCLUDABLE DELAYS, AND THE ACT SPECIFICALLY STATES THAT EXCLUDABLE DELAYS LISTED ARE NOT EXHAUSTIVE. ALTHOUGH THE ACT REQUIRES DISMISSAL OF CHARGES AGAINST THE ACCUSED SHOULD THE TIME LIMITS BE EXCEEDED, THE ACT DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT DISMISSAL ACT AS A BAR TO FUTURE PROSECUTION. CASE LAW, PARTICULARLY THE U.S. SUPREME COURT ANALYSIS OF THE RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL IN THE BARKER VERSUS WINGO CASE, AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS BEARING ON COURT DELAYS AND THE RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL ARE REVIEWED. MAJOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE ACT AND COURT INTERPRETATIONS INCLUDE THE SETTING OF SPECIFIC TIME LIMITS FOR UNIFORM APPLICATION, THE EXCLUSION OF COURT CONGESTION AS A GROUNDS FOR EXCLUDABLE DELAY, A MORE STRINGENT CONTINUANCE POLICY, AND THE REMOVAL OF THE DEFENDANT'S BURDEN OF PROVING PREJUDICIAL DELAY (AS WAS REQUIRED BY THE SUPREME COURT TEST IN BARKER). MOREOVER, STATUTORY TIME LIMITS ARE NOT DEPENDENT ON THE DEFENDANT'S DEMAND AND JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THE CHARGES WITH OR WITHOUT PREJUDICE. EXTENSIVE NOTES ARE PROVIDED. (JAP)