State and Local Intelligence in the War on Terrorism

• NCJ Number: 214408
• Author(s): K. Jack Riley; Gregory F. Treverton; Jeremy M. Wilson; Lois M. Davis
• Date Published: 2005
• Length: 92 pages
• Corporate Author: Rand Corporation
• Sale Source: Rand Corporation
• Publication Format: Document (Online)
• Publication Type: Report (Study/Research)
• Language: English
• Country: United States of America
• Note: Downloaded May 31, 2006.

Annotation

This examination of how State and local law enforcement agencies (LEAs) conducted and supported counterterrorism intelligence activities after the terrorist attacks of September 11 presents the results of a 2002 survey of law enforcement preparedness, case studies of individual law enforcement agencies and their post-September 11 intelligence activities, and an analysis of statistics on wiretaps and related oversight activities.

Abstract

The survey found that most State and local LEAs have conducted terrorism threat assessments; local LEAs were more likely to have conducted an assessment after September 11. Approximately one-third of local LEAs reported collaborating with the FBI's joint terrorism task forces. Approximately 16 percent of local LEAs have specialized terrorism units, and 75 percent of States reported having such units, with State LEA terrorism units being more likely to have expansive roles, such as training. The case studies show that in local LEAs the counterterrorism function is generally informal and set by the chain of command. They rely on Federal guidelines in shaping their intelligence function; the terrorist threat has raised awareness about what should and can be done in intelligence gathering, analysis, retention, and dissemination. Local LEAs have increased their commitment of human resources to counterterrorism efforts, usually at the expense of other policing areas. Most local departments have little capacity, however, to analyze the information they collect or receive. There has been a substantial increase in State and local involvement in wiretaps, with the Federal courts virtually always retaining oversight authority. The issues that should be addressed are the sustainability of State and local LEA intelligence activity; insufficient training of LEA personnel involved in intelligence activity; the lack of a doctrine for shaping State and local LEA intelligence activity; and uncertainty about what to do with intelligence information collected when it involves American citizens. Extensive tables and 29 references