NCJ Number
31765
Journal
Washington University Law Quarterly Volume: 1975 Issue: 2 Dated: (1975) Pages: 423-446
Date Published
1975
Length
24 pages
Annotation
IN THIS 1972 CASE, THE SUPREME COURT RESTRICTED THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN PRETRIAL CORPOREAL IDENTIFICATIONS TO THOSE PROCEDURES OCCURING AFTER THE INITIATION OF FORMAL JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE ACCUSED.
Abstract
THIS NOTE ATTEMPTS TO DETERMINE THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT STATE IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES, AND TO EVALUATE THE TREATMENT GIVEN KIRBY BY THE STATE COURTS. IT ALSO EXAMINES THE GENERAL BASIS OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN THE CONTEXT OF CORPOREAL IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES, AND ALTERNATIVES TO KIRBY WHICH THE STATE MIGHT ADOPT. ALTERNATIVES IDENTIFIED INCLUDE REJECTION OF THE DECISION, A BROAD INTERPRETATION OF THE LANGUAGE OF KIRBY AS TO WHEN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS BEGIN, AND APPLICATION OF THE MCNABB-MALLORY RULE, WHICH PROVIDES THAT AFTER AN ARREST, AN ACCUSED MUST BE BROUGHT BEFORE A MAGISTRATE WITHOUT UNNECESSARY DELAY. THE AUTHOR CONCLUDES, HOWEVER, THAT DUE TO THE EASE WITH WHICH LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS CAN CIRCUMVENT THE LIMITED PROTECTIONS REMAINING AFTER KIRBY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT MANY FEDERAL IDENTIFICATION CONFRONTATIONS IS DEAD. (AUTHOR ABSTRACT MODIFIED)