NCJ Number
190127
Journal
Maryland Law Review Volume: 60 Issue: 2 Dated: 2001 Pages: 373-392
Editor(s)
Bryan M. Giblin
Date Published
2001
Length
20 pages
Annotation
This note presented the United States Supreme Court case of Strickler v. Greene in understanding the preservation of the “reasonable probability” standard in the prevention of injustice and in the resolution of issues of prejudice in “Brady” violation cases, where there was a breach of the prosecutor’s obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence.
Abstract
In the case of Strickler v. Greene, the United States Supreme Court considered whether the Commonwealth of Virginia had violated Brady v. Maryland (Brady violations). In 1990, Thomas David Strickler and Ronald Henderson abducted, robbed, and murdered Leanne Whitlock. Strickler was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. Because of the prosecution’s open file policy, Strickler’s counsel did not file a pre-trial motion for discovery of possible exculpatory evidence. Strickler filed several appeals on the basis that his counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to file a motion under Brady v. Maryland where the prosecution is obligated to disclose exculpatory evidence. The Supreme Court granted a certiorari to see whether the Commonweath had violated the 1963 Brady rule, and if so, whether Strickler had established the prejudice necessary to undermine confidence in the jury’s verdict, thereby creating the reasonable probability standard where the result of the trial would have been different had the suppressed documents been disclosed to the defense. In Strickler v. Greene, the Supreme Court preserved reasonable probability as the standard by which to measure whether the defendant received a fair trial in the absence of certain exculpatory material undisclosed to the defense. By preserving the reasonable probability standard in resolving issues of prejudice in Brady violations, the majority rejected the “sliding scale significant” possibility standard, due to its inability to establish materiality in the constitutional sense and that reasonable probability was more appropriate to ensure that due process rights were protected and injustice prevented.