NCJ Number
167835
Date Published
1996
Length
6 pages
Annotation
In the 1970's, guidelines were established to restrict the FBI's domestic intelligence gathering; the guidelines need to be loosened so that the bureau can prevent terrorist attacks.
Abstract
In March 1976, after more than a year of scrutiny by a select Senate committee under the chairmanship of Frank Church, Attorney General Edward Levi imposed "guidelines" on the FBI that prohibited any investigation without "specific articulable facts giving reason to believe that an individual or a group is or may be engaged in" criminal activities. This requirement for a "criminal predicate" abandoned law enforcement's preventive and peacekeeping functions. Five days before Levi issued his guidelines, the FBI's intelligence division had 4,868 domestic security investigations underway; 6 months later there were 626; by August 1982 Congress found the number had dwindled to 38. Unless a terrorist network announces itself periodically with press releases claiming credit for its violent acts, the FBI will not pursue it. This is the practice if not the disclosed rule. The current criminal-conduct-only guidelines ignore the well- documented sociology of terrorist movements. Such movements contain only a few who will build and plant bombs or lay and execute ambushes, but many will give the actors support: medical help, money, hiding places, intelligence, and such. These support networks must be built in advance of the onslaught. Building them requires words to attract and recruit sympathizers. This is the stage at which swift apprehension can limit the damage. Penetrating the terrorist's screen of sympathizers requires intelligence of a surgical precision that can be obtained only with the full arsenal of clandestine operations: informant networks, electronic surveillance, and covert action.