Successful Regulatory Negotiation (The Brown Company Case) (From Resolving Environmental Regulatory Disputes, P 5-29, 1983, Lawrence Susskind et al, eds. - See NCJ-101992)

• NCJ Number: 101993
• Author(s): D Gilmore
• Date Published: 1983
• Length: 25 pages
• Sale Source: Schenkman Publishing Co
• Language: English
• Country: United States of America

Annotation

Negotiations between the Brown Co. of Berlin, N.H., and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to bring the company's discharge of sulfur dioxide within air quality standards were successful due to each party's agreement to gains by the other.

Abstract

The EPA initially wanted Brown to switch to low-sulfur fuel, but Brown resisted because of the cost of low-sulfur oil. During the negotiations, Brown received an unsolicited proposal for a new bark boiler, which became the basis for a negotiated solution to the conflict. The new bark-burning boiler permitted Brown to burn high-sulfur oil and satisfied the EPA by bringing the sulfur dioxide discharge within air quality standards. EPA, however, did not obtain the lowest achievable emissions rate for the pollutants. The joint problemsolving approach in the negotiations was based on the familiarity and trust that already existed between the parties' lead negotiators. Both parties enhanced problemsolving by conducting flexible and open negotiations. This case highlights the importance of using existing incentives and creating new incentives so that both parties gain through negotiations. 51 references and 135 footnotes.