NCJ Number
176448
Journal
Criminal Justice Policy Review Volume: 9 Issue: 2 Dated: 1998 Pages: 209-231
Date Published
1998
Length
23 pages
Annotation
The United States Supreme Court's use of social science was examined by means of an analysis of the Court's historical use of social science findings and a comparison of how the Court has used social science research in cases involving capital punishment, death-qualified juries, and employment discrimination.
Abstract
Results revealed that the Court does not consistently rely on or accept social science. The Court has consistently stated in death-penalty cases why it should not accept social science evidence that demonstrated the lack of a deterrent value and the inconsistent way in which capital punishment is sought and applied. In contrast, the Court has accepted with relative ease social science evidence demonstrating employment discrimination. Three possible explanations for the Court's inconsistent reliance on social science are that the Court relies only on the best social science, that only certain justices reject social science, and that the Court rejects social science in death penalty and death-qualified jury cases because they fear the repercussions of an affirmative decision. This study's findings do not support the first two explanations; however, the Court hinted at a fear of repercussions in death penalty cases in its decision in the 1976 decision in Gregg v. Georgia. Despite these findings, the future of social science in the courts is promising. Note, list of case citations, and 41 references (Author abstract modified)