NCJ Number
244043
Date Published
December 2011
Length
3 pages
Annotation
This paper reviews and interprets the impact of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in "Michigan v. Bryant," 562 U.S. 131 S.Ct. 1143 (2011), which held that a statement made to police by a dying man that he was shot by Bryant was an "ongoing emergency" and therefore "non-testimonial," meaning that the statement was not subject to the sixth amendment's right for Bryant to confront the witness (confrontation clause) against him.
Abstract
Bryant sought to have the dying man's statement suppressed under the confrontation clause, since he did not have the right to confront the person making the statement, although the trial court denied this claim. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed Bryant's conviction, holding that the incriminating statements of the dying victim were testimonial and thus subject to the confrontation clause. In reinstating Bryant's conviction, the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed the "primary purpose" test from "Davis" directed the use of an objective evaluation of the case circumstances to determine the primary purpose of the statement; clarified that the existence of an ongoing emergency is among the most important factors to consider, but not the only factor; and explained that the statements and actions of both the declarant and the interrogators provided objective evidence of the primary purpose of the interrogation. The Court repeated its holding in "Davis," i.e., that "Statements are non-testimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution." 9 notes