NCJ Number
94250
Date Published
1984
Length
169 pages
Annotation
This book documents a plan for a governmental structure to meet the terrorist threat.
Abstract
A number of countries, such as Turkey and some of the Latin American countries, have managed to bring endemic terrorism under control. Their gains, however, were at the expense of sacrificing civil liberties. Intelligence is a basic and essential element in the struggle against terrorism. The United States has a formal policy of not negotiating with terrorists. In general, when the no concessions policy has been applied strictly, there has been killing of the hostages. To be credible, a policy towards terrorism requires consistent application and the perception by all that it is backed by effective enforcement measures. The U.S. has never applied a tough policy consistently. The U.S. response structure has a number of undesirable characteristics. Balkanization is the most prominent, but there are others, including instability, distance between the expert and the decisionmaker, and distance between experts. The proposed model places political feasibility above theoretical purity. A basic principle is that any viable response mechanism must have the top of its chain of command close enough to the President to reflect his wishes and to serve as an educational tool for him. The model depends to some extent on the adoption of new laws by Congress. For example, Congress might enact laws authorizing the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to intervene in all terrorist-type crimes, supplementing rather than superseding State and local actions. Additional laws might enable the FBI to investigate any crime committed by terrorist groups. A significant change would be to authorize the Central Intelligence Agency to develop information regarding terrorist groups operating within the United States. Most of these groups have international connections or interests. A 13-page bibliography, a chart of the model, chapter notes, and a list of information sources are provided.