NCJ Number
191714
Journal
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology Volume: 91 Issue: 1 Dated: Fall 2000 Pages: 161-235
Date Published
2000
Length
75 pages
Annotation
This article focuses on a defendant’s abuse of the right to self-representation to block presentation of mental health evidence as recognized by the United States Supreme Court’s 1975 decision in Faretta v. California.
Abstract
The Faretta decision effectively endowed mentally ill defendants with the power to veto the decision to present evidence of their mental illness. Currently the criminal justice system is increasingly overloaded with mentally ill individuals who wrestle with counsel over control of the defense. These clients distort the fact-finding process by effectively filtering out evidence of mental illness relevant to the issue of criminal intent. This filtering process is a fairness issue with origins in the tension between the Sixth Amendment rights to counsel and self-representation and the lack of clarity under case law and ethical canons regarding the allocation of authority within the attorney-client relationship. Scholars and courts have substantially undervalued a shared, societal interest in the integrity and fairness of the criminal justice process. However, society’s interest in the fairness of the proceedings that assess culpability deserves a higher value on the theory that everyone has an interest in ensuring the fullest measure of justice to everyone. Therefore, the trier of fact should consider important evidence related to guilt or punishment even over an individual defendant’s opposition. Three major reforms would restore the proper balance among the values and interest. First, the trier of fact should hear exculpatory evidence of mental illness and the defense attorney should have authority to present this evidence over a defendant’s objection. Second, courts should overrule Faretta’s recognition of an absolute right to self-representation. Finally, criminal trials should be bifurcated to allow the presentation of both the defense preferred by the mentally ill defendant and, if this defense fails, the defense preferred by defense counsel. Footnotes