NCJ Number
131554
Journal
Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics and Public Policy Volume: 5 Issue: 2 Dated: (1991) Pages: 267-280
Date Published
1991
Length
14 pages
Annotation
This analysis of juvenile court waiver argues that despite its faults, it is superior to alternative methods for handling the most serious juvenile offenders, although certain substantive and procedural changes are needed to guide decisionmaking regarding waiver.
Abstract
The argument for waiver rests on the assumptions that the modern juvenile court is preferable to the criminal justice system for most juvenile offenders and that certain cases will inevitably occur in which the minimum appropriate penalty is greater than that available to the juvenile court. Alternatives to waiver include increasing the punishment and incapacitation power of the juvenile court, lowering the maximum age for juvenile court jurisdiction, and legislatively mandating criminal court jurisdiction for specified offenses and offenders. Discretionary waiver is preferable to all these alternatives, although it needs several reforms. These include a basic criterion for making the waiver decision, a workable procedure for reviewing the discretionary waiver decision, and a punishment policy in criminal court that explicitly recognizes that youth must be taken into account in determining the appropriate punishment. Footnotes