NCJ Number
148574
Journal
British Journal of Criminology Volume: 34 Issue: 2 Dated: (Spring 1994) Pages: 105-121
Date Published
1994
Length
17 pages
Annotation
This article analyzes property-crime rates as the outcomes of interactions at the macro level between the decisions of potential offenders to commit crimes and of potential victims to protect their property.
Abstract
Property-crime rates are partly determined by the collective costs-benefits assessment of potential offenders. If more persons think the perceived gains outweigh the perceived costs, more crimes will be committed. The collective behavior of offenders influences the costs- benefits assessments of potential victims regarding their investment in security. If the perceived risks are thought to outweigh the perceived costs of extra security, the quantity and quality of protection measures will increase. If crime rates surpass a certain threshold, a countervailing force is mobilized that will retard the crime increase. The costs-benefits assessments of both parties can be expressed in curves that represent the relationship between the numbers of offenses and the average yields per offense. Offenders will commit more crimes if the yields are higher (the demand curve). Victims will minimize yields by increased security if the numbers of offenses increase (the supply curve). Crime rates will tend to stabilize at the point where the two curves intersect. In this perspective, the level of crime is determined by the interactions between the rational choices of offenders and victims at the macro level. The rational-interactionist model suggests that crime can be significantly decreased through actions by potential victims that increase their security and thus reduce opportunities for potential offenders. 6 figures and 49 references