NCJ Number
227259
Journal
Global Crime Volume: 10 Issue: 1-2 Dated: February-May 2009 Pages: 41-65
Date Published
February 2009
Length
25 pages
Annotation
This study examined an economics approach to the theory of networking in the study of crime.
Abstract
This study examined the network structures that arise endogenously as a result of the interaction between a deterrence policy and the networked agents' responses in adapting the crime network itself. By analyzing the criminals' purposeful choice of network structures as well as their optimal response to various law enforcement policies and strategies, the research presented in this study developed a formal model of criminal networks. This model, after calibration with data on actual networks and the costs and benefits of particular criminal or terrorism activities, can be used as a forecasting tool in designing crime combating policy. The “Lucas critique” that is formalized in this study in the context of criminal networks argues that using history to forecast the future can be misleading. Outcomes and data from the past were predicted on policies that were present in the past. Therefore, developing current crime fighting policy requires that the behavioral responses to policy at a deeper level than simply observing past outcomes be understood. A change in policy will account for a change in criminal’s responses as well. This forecasting model provides one possible framework that can be used to forecast outcomes when the participants have varying degrees of policy awareness. Figures and appendix