NCJ Number
190507
Journal
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism Volume: 24 Issue: 4 Dated: July/August 2001 Pages: 303-313
Date Published
2001
Length
11 pages
Annotation
This article describes the wide range of perspectives on weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
Abstract
The differing perspectives of exaggerators (or alarmists) and underestimators (or minimalists) have little in common. Alarmists are concerned with what could happen, whereas minimalists are more interested in what has happened. Regarding the Aum Shinrikyo’s 1995 sarin attack on the Tokyo subway, minimalists argued that even with the perfect ingredients for chemical and biological weapons (CBW) success (such as financial reserves, well-educated scientists, and a sizeable membership), Aum was still unable to mount a casualty-ridden attack. Policymakers tend to lean toward the alarmist end of the spectrum. Academics, on the other hand, usually cite the significant technical, oral, and political barriers that have prevented mass-casualty attacks in the past. The contrasting views are not restricted to individual assessments. A report released by the Gilmore Commission indicated that terrorists have historically avoided CBW and do not have the technology for producing lethal agents. The National Commission on Terrorism projected that the growing lethality of terrorism in this decade would extend well into the future. A balanced view of the CBW threat is represented in the number of common themes that emerge. Attacks aiming to kill large numbers of people using CBW are very rare. Attacks with CBW will likely be small scale and crude. Terrorist groups interested in CBW will likely employ greater levels of violence over time. Aum is an exceptional example of a terrorist group with its large financial reserves, educated personnel, and legal impediments to investigation in Japan. Some postmodern terrorists are innovative not imitative. Policy discussions regarding terrorism are dominated by “worst case scenario” approaches; a pessimistic outlook formed by a belief that hypothetical scenarios of terror would become a reality. The United States has yet to put together an interagency threat analysis picture that could help focus resources and programs. This is an impediment to addressing the less critical aspects of preventing terrorism. 12 notes