NCJ Number
85078
Journal
British Journal of Criminology Volume: 22 Issue: 3 Dated: (July 1982) Pages: 276-284
Date Published
1982
Length
9 pages
Annotation
Arguments that sentences to protect the public against the future behavior of offenders are unscientific, unwise, unprofitable, or unjust can be countered by evidence of patterns of violence, the value of incapacitation, and consideration of the suffering of victims of recidivists.
Abstract
It is argued that there is no scientific evidence that violent behavior can be predicted, so criminal justice policy should not be based in the presumption that an offender's future behavior is a certainty. While it is true that very few pieces of research have identified predictors that define a group of which a majority will commit further violence, hardly any of the research has been thorough or based on the right type of sample. The samples have not included persons whom both the courts and clinicians have thought it unwise to release, and the followup periods for testing behavioral predictions have been too short. Studies which have used longer followup periods and an extensive battery of variables bearing upon behavior tend to indicate that violence-prone groups can be identified. It has also been argued that efforts to identify dangerous offenders for prolonged sentences introduces the negative dynamics of labeling and opens up to possibility that such sentences will be used for political repression. Such an argument can be countered by pointing up that research has not established the validity of the labeling theory, that labeling is inevitable in any type of restrictive intervention and that any policy must contain parameters to prevent abuse. The high cost of extended incarceration compared to the minimal benefits obtained through preventive incarceration is also pointed out by antiprotectionists. Such an argument fails to give proper weight to the suffering of potential victims. Those who advocate strict retributive punishment hold that sentences should only be applied in accordance with the severity of a crime already committed rather than one that might be committed. Such a view ignores the responsibility of the state to protect citizens. The British Floud Report properly holds that a person proved to have done violence to another can no longer claim the benefit of the presumption of future harmlessness. The seriousness of the act already done warrants precautions against its reoccurring. Fourteen references are provided.