NCJ Number
197776
Journal
Jane's Intelligence Review Volume: 14 Issue: 11 Dated: November 2002 Pages: 20-22
Date Published
November 2002
Length
3 pages
Annotation
This article reports on the findings of the Joint Inquiry Staff investigation of intelligence issues following the September 11 attacks.
Abstract
The author explains that the Joint Inquiry Staff (JIS) of the U.S. Senate and House Intelligence Committees conducted an inquiry into intelligence issues after September 11 in order to ascertain what information about potential threats was known before the attacks and how well that information was shared among key intelligence and law enforcement agencies. The inquiry uncovered the fact that as far back as 1993 there was growing awareness of an escalating terror campaign waged by Al-Qaeda against the United States. The author details several terrorist plots that were uncovered by intelligence sources, such as a plot in 1993 to bomb several New York City landmarks. Some of these terrorist plots were thwarted while others, such as the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center were carried out. Furthermore, the inquiry revealed that United States intelligence agencies received numerous warnings during the late 1990’s regarding the possibility of Al-Qaeda terrorists using aerial suicide attacks against American targets. The report resulting from the inquiry outlines three critical errors that helped Al-Qaeda lead a successful terrorist attack against the United States. First, some of the hijackers may have been disallowed into the United States had their names been entered into the U.S. Department of State’s “watch list.” A second error was the failure of the FBI to place Zacarias Moussaoui under surveillance because of an agent shortage. Third, the inquiry reports that their were many legal misunderstandings about the scope of relevant Federal laws, which ultimately delayed issuance of search warrants. In conclusion, the report notes that bureaucratic entanglements and failures to input data into various electronic databases emerged as the main themes that contributed to intelligence failures before the September 11th attacks.