Whose Reasonable Doubt? Reconsidering the Appropriate Role of the Reviewing Court in the Criminal Decision Making Process

• NCJ Number: 108944
• Journal: American Criminal Law Review Volume: 24 Issue: 4 Dated: (Spring 1987) Pages: 911-981
• Author(s): R J Gregory
• Date Published: 1987
• Length: 71 pages
• Sale Source: National Institute of Justice/; NCJRS Photocopy Services
• Publication Type: Legislation/Policy Analysis
• Language: English
• Country: United States of America

Annotation

In the case of In re Winship, the U.S. Supreme Court set forth the principle that the due process clause requires criminal convictions to be based on evidence establishing the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Abstract

In Jackson v. Virginia, the Court held that a reviewing court must integrate the standard into its sufficiency test, suggesting that this was compelled by the principle of constitutional fact review applied in many other Supreme Court cases. However, so long as courts continue to apply a sufficiency test in which all reasonable inferences are construed in favor of the prosecution, it simply is not possible to fuse the reasonable doubt standard into sufficiency review. Although the Court in Jackson developed a persuasive intellectual framework for testing the sufficiency of evidence in terms of the reasonable doubt standard, it did not support its reasoning with an adequate enforcement mechanism that maximizes the protection afforded the accused, while preserving the integrity of the jury system in decisionmaking. It is argued that the reasonable hypothesis test provides the basis by which a court can effectuate the constitutional framework of Winship and Jackson in a way consistent with the role of the court. Such a mechanism has been practically and effectively used in State courts. 396 footnotes.