Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Demonstrate Urgent Need to Improve Security at the Nation's Airports

• NCJ Number: 191011
• Author(s): Gerald L. Dillingham
• Date Published: 2001
• Length: 14 pages
• Sponsoring Agency: US Government Accountability Office
• Sale Source: US Government Accountability Office; NCJRS Photocopy Services
• Publication Format: Document
• Publication Type: Legislative Hearing/Committee Report
• Language: English
• Country: United States of America
• Note: Testimony before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate; downloaded October 9, 2001.

Annotation

This document presents the vulnerabilities identified throughout the Nation’s aviation system.

Abstract

This information is based on prior work and includes assessments of security concerns with aviation-related computer systems, airport access controls, and passenger and carry-on baggage screening, including how other countries differ in their screening practices. Reviews of the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) oversight of air traffic control (ATC) computer systems showed that the FAA had not followed some critical aspects of its own security requirements. The FAA had not ensured that ATC buildings and facilities were secure, that the systems themselves were protected, and that the contractors who access these systems had undergone background checks. As a result, the ATC system was susceptible to intrusion and malicious attacks. FAA is addressing the 22 recommendations to improve computer security but most have yet to be completed. Controls for limiting access to secure areas, including aircraft, have not always worked as intended. In one series of tests, the Inspector General’s staff successfully gained access to secure areas 68 percent of the time. Tests of screeners revealed significant weaknesses as measured in their ability to detect threat objects located on passengers or contained in their carry-on luggage. A principal cause of screeners’ performance problems was the rapid turnover among screeners. Also, there has been too little attention given to factors such as the sufficiency of the training given to screeners. Screening operations in Belgium, Canada, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom differ in some significant ways. Their screening operations require more extensive qualifications and training for screeners, include higher pay and better benefits, and often include different screening techniques, such as “pat-downs” of some passengers. Most of these countries place responsibility for screening with airport authorities or the government instead of air carriers. Additional considerations for the immediate future include prioritizing outstanding recommendations that address security and identifying the sources and amounts of funding needed.