Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Illustrate Severe Weaknesses in Aviation Security

• NCJ Number: 191012
• Author(s): Gerald L. Dillingham
• Date Published: 2001
• Length: 14 pages
• Sponsoring Agency: US Government Accountability Office
• Sale Source: US Government Accountability Office; NCJRS Photocopy Services
• Publication Format: Document
• Publication Type: Legislative Hearing/Committee Report
• Language: English
• Country: United States of America
• Note: Testimony before the Subcommittees on Transportation, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations; October 9, 2001

Annotation

This document outlines the vulnerabilities of the Nation’s aviation system.

Abstract

Reviews of the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) oversight of air traffic control (ATC) computer systems showed that the FAA had not followed some critical aspects of its own security requirements. The FAA had not ensured that ATC buildings and facilities were secure, that the systems themselves were protected, and that the contractors who access these systems had undergone background checks. As a result, the ATC system was susceptible to intrusion and malicious attacks. The FAA is making progress in addressing the 22 recommendations to improve computer security, but most have yet to be completed. Controls for limiting access to secure areas, including aircraft, have not always worked as intended. Special agents used fictitious law enforcement badges and credentials to gain access to secure areas, bypass security checkpoints at two airports, and walk unescorted to aircraft departure gates. The FAA is acting on the weaknesses identified and is implementing improvements to more closely check the credentials of law enforcement officers. Tests of screeners revealed significant weaknesses as measured in their ability to detect threat objects located on passengers or contained in their carry-on luggage. Recent results have shown that as testing gets more realistic -- as tests more closely approximate how a terrorist might attempt to penetrate a checkpoint -- screeners’ performance declines significantly. Causes of the screeners’ performance problems are rapid turnover, low wages, limited benefits and repetitive, monotony of the work. In contrast, the countries of Belgium, Canada, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom have better screener performance and lower screener turnover. Their screening operations require more extensive qualifications and training for screeners, include higher pay and better benefits, and often include different screening techniques, such as “pat-downs” of some passengers. Another significant difference was that most of these countries placed responsibility for screening with airport authorities or the government instead of air carriers. 6 notes